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Abstract
An auction is a simple way of selling and buying goods. Modern auc-
tion protocols often rely on complex cryptographic operations to ensure
manifold security properties such as bidder-anonymity or bid-privacy, non-
repudiation, fairness or public verifiability of the result. This makes them
difficult to understand for users who are not experts in cryptography. We
propose two physical auction protocols inspired by Sako’s cryptographic
auction protocol. In contrast to Sako’s protocol, they do not rely on
cryptographic operations, but on physical properties of the manipulated
mechanical objects to ensure the desired security properties. The first pro-
tocol only uses standard office material, whereas the second uses a special
wooden box. We validate the security of our solutions using ProVerif.
1 Introduction
Auctions provide sellers and buyers with a way to exchange goods for a mutually
acceptable price. Unlike a marketplace, where the sellers compete with each
other, auctions are a seller’s market where buyers bid against each other over
the goods for sale. Because of the competitive nature of the process, often an
auctioneer serves as a trusted third party to mediate the process. However, in
many cases (for example on eBay) the auctioneer charges a percentage of the
∗A previous version of this technical report was published under the title “Secure Physical
Auctions for the Non-Expert” in ETH e-collection.
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selling price as his fee. Hence he has a financial interest in the auction, which
may compromise his neutrality.
Auction protocols typically rely on assorted cryptographic primitives and/or
trusted parties to simultaneously achieve seemingly contrary security goals like
privacy and verifiability. Examples include signatures of knowledge and zero-
knowledge proofs [27], coin-extractability, range proofs and proofs of knowl-
edge [22], hash chains [33], and proxy-oblivious transfers and secure evaluation
functions [26]. Sako’s protocol [30], explained in detail in Section 2, applies
public-key encryption in a clever way to implement a verifiable sealed-bid auc-
tion. Although it is fully verifiable, the bidders need to trust the auctioneers
for privacy of the losing bids. Brandt’s protocol [8] goes even further: with the
help of an ad hoc cryptographic primitive, Brandt claims to achieve full privacy
for all bidders, i.e. only the winner and the seller learn who the winner is. How-
ever, the reliance on cryptographic primitives has its downside: cryptographic
primitives are complex, and their use requires great care not to introduce subtle
weaknesses, as recent analysis of Brandt’s protocol shows [13].
Moreover, as these protocols rely on complex cryptography, they are difficult
to understand for a non-expert. This is particularly intriguing when it comes
to verifiability – anyone lacking cryptographic expertise cannot ascertain for
themselves that the verification procedure is indeed correct, and is thus forced
to trust the judgment of cryptographic experts. This view underlies the Ger-
man Constitutional Court’s decision on electronic voting machines: “the use of
electronic voting machines requires that the essential steps of the voting and
of the determination of the result can be examined by the citizen reliably and
without any specialist knowledge of the subject” [9]. Chaum [10] argued along
the same line in 2004 that all the ingeniously designed verifiable voting proto-
cols that had been put forward in literature did little to empower actual voters
to verify elections. To address this issue, he proposed a voting protocol using
visual cryptography: the ballot was distributed over two layers, that on top of
each other showed the voter’s choice. One layer was destroyed, leaving the voter
with a layer full of random dots from which no choice can be inferred. However,
anyone can verify that the system accurately recorded this layer – without any
cryptographic expertise. In the same spirit, we propose in this paper two auc-
tion protocols that only rely on physical manipulations to enable non-experts
to understand the protocol and its verification procedure.
Apart from Chaum’s “true voter-verifiable” voting protocol [10], the power
of (partly) physical protocols have also been studied for other applications.
Stajano and Anderson [32] proposed a partly physical auction protocol using
anonymous broadcast (e.g. small radio transmitters), which however still uses
some cryptography (e.g. one-way functions and a Diffie-Hellman key exchange).
More generally, Moran and Naor showed that many cryptographic protocols can
be implemented using tamper-evident seals [25]. They also analyzed a polling
protocol based on physical envelopes [24]. Moreover, in the context of game
theory, Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali [19] showed that a class of games (normal-
form mechanisms) can be implemented using envelopes, ballot boxes, and a
verifiable mediator in a privacy-preserving way. Fagin, Naor and Winkler [18]
described various physical methods of comparing two secret values. Finally,
Schneier [31] proposed a cypher based on a pack of cards.
Although formal verification is now a common approach to evaluate security
properties, few formal analyses exist in the auction domain. Subramanian pro-
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posed a logic to analyze protocols [34], inspired by the BAN logic. He applied
this logic to analyze a simple auction protocol by his own design. Later, Dong
et al. [12] analyzed privacy of the protocol due to Abe and Suzuki [3] using
the Applied pi-Calculus. That auction protocol claims a strong form of privacy
(receipt-freeness), a claim which Dong et al. were able to prove independently.
Ku¨sters et al. [21] proposed generic definitions of accountability and verifiability.
They make a distinction between verifiability (the ability to see that something
went wrong) and accountability (the ability to blame someone for what went
wrong). Ku¨sters et al. used their definitions to identify some problems in the
auction protocol due to Parkes et al. [28]. Dreier et al. [16] formalized fair-
ness, authentication, and privacy notions in the Applied pi-Calculus. This was
followed by a first-order logic definition of auction verifiability in [14].
All this work is however only concerned with the verification of cryptographic
protocols, not physical protocols. Blaze [7] was among the first to argue that
physical security should be taken into account in security modeling. Other work
in this area focused on modeling physical security in various ways. The Portunes
framework by Dimkov et al. [11] allows modeling of attacks that cross physical,
digital and social domains. Basin et al. [4] proposed a model taking physical
dimensions such as time and distance into account. Recently Meadows et al. [23]
describe a way to formalize security procedures (accounting for physical objects)
in logic. By using the frameworks of [16] and [14] we show that we can actually
apply the same definitions used for the cryptographic protocols on protocols
based on physical properties, hence giving us a powerful way to evaluate and
compare both approaches.
Contributions. We start by recalling Sako’s auction protocol [30]. Inspired
by this protocol, we propose a first physical implementation called Envelopako1.
This variant does not require cryptography nor trusted parties, yet retains the
verifiability, privacy, authentication and fairness properties of Sako’s protocol.
Based on the definitions by Dreier et al. [14, 16] we also provide a formal analysis
of these security properties in ProVerif [5], modeling their physical properties
using a special equational theory. Although ensuring privacy for the losing
bidders, both the Sako protocol and the Envelopako variant publicly reveal the
winner. Our final contribution is Woodako2: a physical auction protocol that
offers stronger privacy i.e., the winner is not publicly revealed, yet the result
remains verifiable for losing bidders (similar to the protocol by Brandt [8]). In
this protocol, physical properties take the place of cryptography and the trusted
auctioneer. We build a concrete prototype, and formally verify the security
properties with the help of ProVerif.
Outline. In the next section we describe Sako’s protocol, its security prop-
erties and trust assumptions. In §3, we present the first protocol called “En-
velopako”, and discuss the security properties it achieves. In §4, we describe the
“Woodako” protocol, which ensures a higher level of privacy than Envelopako,
before concluding in §5.
1Envelope version of Sako’s protocol.
2Wooden box based implementation of Sako’s protocol.
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2 Protocol by Sako
Sako [30] proposed a protocol for sealed-bid first-price auctions which hides the
bids of losing bidders and ensures verifiability. The paper provides a high-level
description using a generic cryptographic primitive that ensures certain proper-
ties (e.g. ciphertext indistinguishability). Sako also proposes two instantiations
using specific cryptographic primitives: the first one uses Elgamal [17] encryp-
tion, and the second one employs a probabilistic version of RSA [29]. Note
that in this protocol dishonest authorities can break privacy, but because of
verifiability a manipulation of the auction outcome can be detected.
2.1 Informal Description
Informally, the protocol works as follows:
1. The authorities select a list of allowed bids p1, . . . , pm and a public con-
stant c.
2. For each allowed bid pi, the authorities set up encryption and decryption
algorithms Epi and Dpi (in both implementations simply a public-private
key pair). The encryption scheme must provide an indistinguishability
property. The authorities publish the encryption algorithms (or public
keys in the implementation) and the list of allowed bids on a bulletin
board (a public append-only broadcast channel).
3. To bid for price pi, a bidder encrypts the public constant c using Epi , signs
it and publishes the bid Cj = Epi(c) together with the signature on the
bulletin board.
4. After the bidding phase is over, the authorities check the signatures and
start decrypting all bids with the highest possible price t = pm. If
Dt(Cj) = c, then bid j was a bid for price t. If all decryptions fail,
the authorities decrease t and try again. Each time a decryption is done,
they publish a proof of correct decryption to enable verifiability. This can
be a zero-knowledge proof, or it might be achieved by simply publishing
the secret key.
5. To verify the outcome, anybody can verify the signatures, and check the
proofs of correct decryption.
In the rest of the this section we consider the implementation based on public
and private key pairs as a concretization of the general encryption/decryption
algorithms, however we abstract away of the precise encryption scheme. Note
that dishonest authorities can break privacy since they have access to all secret
keys, but because of verifiability a manipulation of the auction outcome can be
detected.
2.2 Security Properties
We now argue informally that the protocol ensures Fairness, Non-Repudiation,
Non-Cancellation (as defined in [16]) and Verifiability (as defined in [14]).
Moreover it ensures Privacy of the losing bidders [16] if the authorities are
trusted.
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Non-Cancellation and Non-Repudiation [16]. The bids are signed and
published on the append-only bulletin board. Hence a bidder cannot deny that
he made his bid, and the submitted bids cannot be altered or otherwise canceled.
Fairness. We consider the two aspects defined in [16]:
• Highest-Price-Wins: This property is to ensure that an attacker cannot
win the auction at a price below the actual highest bid. In this protocol,
the authorities start by decrypting using the decryption algorithm corre-
sponding to the highest possible price (if not, this can be detected, see
Verifiability), hence they will identify the highest bid. Similarly, because
of the signatures on the bids and the properties of the bulletin board, the
bids cannot be modified, deleted or replaced. Hence the bidder submit-
ting the highest price will be correctly identified as the winner, even in
presence of an attacker controlling the network.
• Weak-Non-Interference: This property is to ensure that no information
about the bidders’ bids is leaked before the bidding phase ends – otherwise
they might employ unfair strategies based on that information. In this
protocol the bids leak no other information apart from the identity of
the bidders (revealed by the signature) because of the indistinguishability
property of the encryption scheme.
Verifiability. Everybody can check the signatures of the bids on the bulletin
board, ensuring that all bids originated from eligible bidders and were not mod-
ified. Similarly, all participants can use the proofs of correct decryption to check
whether the authorities opened the bids correctly, hence ensuring the correctness
of the outcome computation.
Privacy. The authorities have all private keys and can hence open all bids,
breaking privacy. If the authorities are trusted, they will discard all unused
keys, thereby preventing anyone from opening the losing bids and breaking
the privacy of losing bidders. Given the indistinguishability property of the
encryption scheme, this ensures secrecy of the losing bids.
2.3 Formal Model
To formally verify the above properties we use ProVerif [5]. ProVerif uses a
process description heavily inspired by the Applied pi-Calculus [1], however has
syntactical extensions and is enriched by events to check reachability and corre-
spondence properties. We do not recall the full syntax and semantics here, this
is available in the original paper [5] and the ProVerif documentation [6].
In short, the behavior of honest parties is modeled as processes in ProVerif.
These processes can exchange messages on public or private channels, create
keys or fresh random values and perform tests and cryptographic operations,
which are modeled as functions on terms with respect to an equational theory
describing their properties. In ProVerif, the attacker has complete control of
the network (excluding private channels).
To verify Sako’s protocol we need to model public-key encryption, signatures
and proofs of correct decryption. This can be done using the following equational
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1 l e t b idder (b : pkey , k : skey , chBB : channel ) =
2 new s : seed ; l e t o f f e r : b i t s t r i n g = penc ( bidval , b , s ) in
3 event bid ( o f f e r , pubkey ( k ) ) ;
4 out (chBB , ( o f f e r , s i gn ( o f f e r , k ) ) ) .
Listing 1: The bidder.
theory:
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) =m
getmessage(sign(m, k)) =m
dec(penc(m, pk(k), s), k) =m
checkproof(decProof(penc(m, pk(k), s),m, k),
penc(m, pk(k), s),m, pk(k)) = true
checkproof(decProof(penc(m, pk(k1), s),
dec(penc(m, pk(k1), s), k2), k2), penc(m, pk(k1), s),
dec(penc(m, pk(k1), s), k2), pk(k2)) = true
The first two equations model signatures: If a signature on the message m
is checked using the correct public key, we obtain the message m. Similarly
the third equation models probabilistic public-key encryption: A message m
encrypted with a public key pk(k) and a fresh random seed s can only be
opened using the corresponding private key k. The last two equations model
proofs of correct decryption: The verification succeeds if the proposed plaintext
is the actual decryption of the ciphertext under the claimed key, even if this
decryption is not meaningful as the key is not the correct one.
Consider the ProVerif code in Listing 1 describing the behavior of a bid-
der in Sako’s protocol. The bidder process has three parameters: the key b,
corresponding to the key representing his bid, his secret key k used for signing
and the channel to the bulletin board chBB. He draws a fresh random seed s,
encrypts the constant bidval using the price-key b, computes a signature on
the ciphertext, executes the event bid on his (signed) offer and sends it to the
bulletin board.
The authority is modeled as shown in Listing 2. Firstly the bids are received
from the bulletin board. Then the signatures are checked and the bids are
decrypted using the key corresponding to the highest possible price, and the
decryptions are published together with a proof. Finally, if the first bidder
submitted a bid for the highest price, he is declared a winner, otherwise the
second bid is checked, and so on. If none of the decryptions is correct, the
authority decreases the price and tries again.
Having completed the modeling of the protocol, we need to express the
security properties. Here we rely on the definitions by [16] and [14].
2.4 Analysis
We test Non-Repudiation using the following query in ProVerif
query offer:bitstring,id:pkey;
event(won(offer,id)) ==> event(bid(offer,id)).
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1 l e t author i ty ( p1 : skey , . . . , pm: skey , k1 : pkey , . . . , kn : pkey ,
2 chBB1 : channel , . . . , chBBn : channel , chO11 : channel , . . . ,
3 chOn1 : channel , . . . , chO1m : channel , . . . , chOnm: channel ,
4 chW: channel ) =
5 in (chBB1 , (m1: b i t s t r i n g , s1 : b i t s t r i n g ) ) ; . . .
6 in (chBBn , (mn: b i t s t r i n g , sn : b i t s t r i n g ) ) ;
7 i f checks ign ( s1 , k1 ) = m1 && . . . && checks ign ( sn , kn ) = mn then
8 l e t dec11 = dec (m1, p1 ) in
9 out ( chO11 , ( m1, dec11 , decProof (m1, dec11 , p1 ) ) ) ; . . .
10 l e t dec1n = dec (mn, p1 ) in
11 out (chOn1 , (mn, dec1n , decProof (mn, dec1n , p1 ) ) ) ;
12 i f dec11 = bidva l then
13 event won(m1, k1 ) ; out (chW, ( m1, s1 , one , one ) )
14 e l s e i f . . .
15 . . .
16 e l s e i f dec1n = bidva l then
17 event won(mn, kn ) ; out (chW, (mn, sn , n , one ) )
18 e l s e
19 . . .
20 l e t decm1 = dec (m1,pm) in
21 out (chO1m , ( m1, decm1 , decProof (m1, decm1 ,pm) ) ) ; . . .
22 l e t decmn = dec (mn,pm) in
23 out (chOnm, (mn, decmn , decProof (mn, decmn ,pm) ) ) ;
24 i f decm1 = bidva l then
25 event won(m1, k1 ) ; out (chW, ( m1, s1 , one ,m) )
26 e l s e i f . . .
27 . . .
28 e l s e i f decmn = bidva l then
29 event won(mn, km) ; out (chW, (mn, sn , n ,m) ) .
Listing 2: The authority.
1 l e t t e s t r v s (chRVS : channel , k1 : pkey , . . . , kn : skey ,
2 chBB1 : channel , . . . , chBBn : channel ) =
3 in (chBB1 , (m1: b i t s t r i n g , s1 : b i t s t r i n g ) ) ; . . .
4 in (chBBn , (mn: b i t s t r i n g , sn : b i t s t r i n g ) ) ;
5 i f checks ign ( s1 , k1 ) = m1 && . . .
6 && checks ign ( sn , kn ) = mn then
7 out (chRVS ,OK)
8 e l s e
9 out (chRVS ,KO) .
Listing 3: The test rvs.
1 l e t b idder (b : pkey , k : skey , chBB : channel , chAd : channel )=
2 new s : seed ; out (chAd , ( s , b ) ) ; in (chAd , o f f e r : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
3 event bid ( o f f e r , pubkey ( k ) ) ;
4 out (chBB , ( o f f e r , s i gn ( o f f e r , k ) ) ) .
Listing 4: The dishonest bidder.
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To also account for dishonest bidders, we give all data of the bidder except for
his secret key to the intruder, and let him compose the message which is signed
and sent to the bulletin board (see Listing 4 for the modified bidder’s process).
ProVerif proves that the property still holds.
Non-Cancellation is tested using a process that tests if the conjunction of
events recBid and won for a lower bid occurs, and then executes an event
bad. ProVerif concludes that this event is unreachable using the query query
event(bad()).
For Highest Price Wins, we again use a process that executes an event bad if
a situation violating the property (i.e. an event won for a bidder different from
the one submitting the highest bid) is detected. ProVerif can then conclude
that such an event is unreachable.
To verify Weak Non-Interference we use the choice operator. In ProVerif
let x=choice[a,b] in P means that ProVerif will compare the processes P
where x is either a or b, and try to prove their observational equivalence. We
use a small python script to generate all the cases for two bidders and two prices,
which can then successfully be checked using ProVerif.
Privacy is also tested using the choice operator. As the protocol reveals the
winner and the winning price, the highest achievable privacy notion is Strong
Bidding-Price Secrecy (cf. [16]). Hence we test two situations, where in both
situations bidder one bids the same highest price one and wins. In situation
one bidder two bids price two, in situation two he bids three. Since he loses in
both situations, no information about his bid should be leaked, and both situ-
ations should be observationally equivalent. If we suppose an honest authority,
ProVerif is able to prove this result, even if we add a corrupted bidder. Note
that the protocol is neither receipt-free nor coercion-resistant as the random
values used to encrypt the constant can be used as a receipt.
Proving Verifiability consists in proving that the verification tests are sound
and complete. Here we have three verification tests following the model of [14]:
• A test rvs that checks if all bids were submitted by registered bidders,
which consists of checking the signatures
• A test rvw that checks if the winning bid is one of the submitted bids
• A test ov that verifies that the announced winning bid is actually the
highest bid
In each case, we express the test as a process that takes as input the data from
the auction and accepts or not this input (see for example Listing 3). For sound-
ness we then need to prove that the test only accepts if the result was actually
correct, which can be achieved by testing if the branch accepting the outcome is
reachable for an incorrect input – again a query for the event bad. Similarly for
completeness we test if the branch rejecting the input data is reachable when
the input is generated by honest parties according to the protocol specifica-
tion. ProVerif is able to conclude successfully for all six cases (completeness
and soundness of each test). For all the tests described in this section ProVerif
only takes a few seconds to answer; the code is available online [15].
Remark 1 In the literature an attack on fairness was described [2]. The attack
targets the implementation using the ElGamal encryption and works as follows.
A dishonest bidder encrypts the constant using a key of his choice, but using zero
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as a random value. He obtains a ciphertext of the form (1,M), which decrypts
under any private key. A dishonest authority can then decrypt the bid at any
chosen price, for example one euro higher than the highest other bid.
This attack violates Highest Price Wins: a corrupted bidder that did not
submit the highest bid wins. Note that we did not identify it as we assume an
honest authority, whereas the attack requires the authority to collude with the
bidder. If however we decide to consider dishonest authorities, we obviously
have even simpler attacks: the authorities can simply announce a winner and
winning price of their choice.
However, this attack will be detected during the verification phase. If the
authority decides to open the bogus bid at price xm + 1, he has to prove that
the bogus bid does not decrypt to the value bidval for any key corresponding to
a price higher than xm + 1. Since the bogus bid decrypts under any key, he is
unable to do so. The only possible way to pass the verification test is to open
the bogus bid at the highest possible price and to declare the dishonest bidder
a winner at this price, since then no other keys are used in the verification.
This however gives the bidder no advantage over simply submitting a bid for the
highest price using a correct encryption, hence the attack does not compromise
fairness if the verification is carried out correctly.
Remark 2 As noted in the original paper [30], there is another fairness issue.
In the abstract version of the protocol, a dishonest bidder can copy somebody
else’s bid, sign it, and submit it as his own bid. This allows him to provoke a
tie, i.e. he is sure not to bid the same price as a targeted bidder. In our model
ties are automatically resolved by choosing the first bidder to submit the winning
offer, hence the attack does not occur in our setting. However in general the
protocol supports other tie-breaking mechanisms, where this attack can become a
problem. Note however that this issue is easy to address – Sako proposed three
possible fixes: rejecting copies, adding proofs of ownership, or adding the bidders
identity to the encrypted plaintext.
3 The “Envelopako” Protocol
This protocol is a practical implementation of Sako’s protocol using office ma-
terial.
3.1 Description
In the Envelopako protocol each bidder has one sheet of paper per price (the
bidding form) and as many envelopes with a transparent window (see Fig. 1).
To bid for his chosen price, the bidder marks “Yes” on the bidding form corre-
sponding to his price, and “No” on all other forms. All forms are inserted into
the envelopes, and signed on the outside by the bidder. The envelopes are sealed
and shown to all other bidders so that they can check the signatures. For m
possible prices pm > pm−1 > . . . > p1, the bid thus consists of m envelopes. The
window allows to see the price without opening the envelope, yet the envelope
hides whether the bidder chose “Yes” or “No”.
Once all bidders have finished creating bids and shown their signatures,
the bidders randomly exchange their bids (i.e. the sets of m envelopes) and
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Price pi:
Yes
No
(a) Envelopako biding form for price pi.
Window
Bidder’s
Signature
(b) Envelopako bidding envelope for price pi.
Figure 1: The Envelopako protocol
jointly open the envelopes, starting with the highest possible price pm. If one
of the envelopes contains a “Yes”, the bidders identified a bid for this (highest)
price, and hence a winner. The signature on the outside then allows for the
identification of the winner. If all envelopes contain “No”, the bidders open
the envelopes for the second price, and so on. Since the order of the prices
is important, the window allows to see the price from the outside, without
revealing the bidders choice. Note also that the opening happens in presence of
all bidders and the seller to ensure that protocol is followed.
To fully ensure verifiability, the protocol must also ensure that only eligible
bidders can bid. This is achieved through the verification of the signatures on
the envelopes by the seller and bidders when bids are posted.
3.2 Security Properties
The Envelopako protocol relies on the physical properties of the envelopes: No-
body can see from the outside the contents of a envelope, in particular whether
the bidder marked “Yes” or “No” for a given price, and opening the envelopes
breaks the seal. Hence the bids are private, and by opening the envelopes one
by one in decreasing order only the winning bid(s) is/are revealed. The losing
bids remain private. The protocol offers verifiability similar to Sako’s protocol
as well as non-cancellation and non-repudiation due to the signatures and the
mixing of the envelopes: All participants are in the same room, can check the
signatures, and whether an envelope contained a “Yes” or “No”. It ensures
fairness since no premature information is leaked (Weak Non-Interference) and
due to the joint bid opening no cheating is possible (Highest Price Wins).
Obviously a malicious bidder can open an envelope of his choice to read
its contents – but this is actually similar to Sako’s protocol, where dishonest
authorities can break privacy. The difference is that in Envelopako such a
behavior will be detected by the other bidders, since they are in the same room
and the envelope is damaged. An extension to improve privacy could be to put
the signed envelopes into slightly bigger and indistinguishable envelopes after
the signature has been verified by the other parties. These envelopes can be
posted into a ballot box (one per possible price) to break the link between a
bidder and his bid. Hence a malicious bidder can only break the privacy of a
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random bid, but not necessary of the one he is interested in.
Moreover, a bidder can fill out the bidding form incorrectly, or submit to
many or not enough envelopes. However, as the participants check the signatures
at the beginning, any such misbehavior (even if only detected later on when the
envelopes are opened) can be attributed to the bidder, and his incorrect bid
simply ignored.
Since the security of the protocol relies on the the fact that the envelopes
hide their content and are tamper-evident, side-channel attacks against these
properties have to be considered. For example a malicious party could try to
read the marking through the envelopes by holding it against a strong light
source. This can be circumvented by using envelopes lined with thick black
paper. Another attack could be to insert carbon paper into the envelope together
with an empty bidding form, in order to chose the bid’s content later on by
marking on the outside. However the bids are handed over to the other parties
to prevent tampering, and the carbon paper can be found when opening the
envelopes. Moreover, some efforts have to be made to ensure that the envelopes
are really tamper-evident, yet this is beyond the scope of the paper (see for
example [25] for a discussion of different types of tamper-evident seals, or [20] for
their security). Overall we argue although such side-channel attacks are possible,
they can be well-controlled due to the secure environment (the presence of all
participants), and thus do not present a bigger risk than side-channel attacks
on implementations of classical cryptographic protocols.
3.3 Formal Analysis
We model the bidders as processes exchanging messages (envelopes or real com-
munication messages), however we also need to model the physical properties of
the objects used. Our approach consists in modeling these physical properties
following the usual technique used in symbolic models: the primitives are “per-
fectly secure” and we simply describe their abstract properties. In the Applied
pi-Calculus the primitives are modeled using an equational theory. Here we de-
scribe the envelope using a function envelope that is created using a random
seed to hide its contents, and can only be opened using that seed, similar to a
cryptographic commitment. This yields the following equational theory:
open(envelope(content , k), k) = content
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) =m
getmessage(sign(m, k)) =m
getpubkey(sign(m, k)) = pk(k)
The last three equations model signatures. The first equation allows to verify a
signature, the second equation to obtain the signed message, and the last one
to identify the person who signed the message.
The honest participants obviously only open the envelopes they are supposed
to, but dishonest participants can also open ones they are not supposed to. To
model the fact that any party in possession of an envelope can open it, the
bidders give away the random seed they used to create it when giving away the
envelope.
This allows us to repeat the same verification steps as for Sako’s protocol
and to conclude that the protocol ensures Non-Repudiation, Non-Cancellation,
Weak Non-Interference, Highest Price Wins and Verifiability.
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When verifying Privacy, ProVerif finds the obvious attacks of opening the
envelopes. If we assume the bidders to be honest, since probably they do not
want to risk being caught when breaking the rules, we can model this as follows.
Instead of giving away all seeds directly when giving away their envelopes, the
bidders keep them private, and only publish the required ones (i.e. the ones
down to the winning price, but not below). In this case ProVerif is able to
prove secrecy of the losing bids. All the above verifications succeed within a few
seconds on a standard office PC; the full code is available online [15].
3.4 A distributed variant
The Envelopako protocol requires all participants to be in the same room during
the bid opening, yet we can build a distributed protocol with a few minor
modifications, and assuming a semi-trusted seller. Firstly each bidder also signs
on the bidding form. To prevent issues resulting from multiple instances run
in parallel, the bidders should also add an auction identifier to the form to
link their bid to a specific auction. After preparing the envelopes, each bidder
then sends (e.g. by postal mail) his envelopes to the seller, who collects all
envelopes. The seller then determines the winner using the same technique
as above.3 To prove to the bidders that his result is correct, he sends them
photocopies of all bidding forms from the envelopes he opened. Moreover, he
returns the unopened envelopes to the bidders, in order to prove that he did not
violate privacy. This allows all bidders to verify the correctness of the outcome,
and even their privacy. In this variant the seller is semi-trusted in the sense
that he can misbehave and violate some properties of the protocol, e.g. privacy
by opening all envelopes. However his behavior is completely verifiable, i.e. any
misbehavior is detectable.
4 The “Woodako” Protocol
To improve the privacy of the Envelopako protocol, we developed Woodako,
which relies on a special wooden box. Our prototype is designed for 3 bidders
and 5 possible prices, but such a box can be built for other numbers n,m of
bidders and prices. Fig. 2a shows all components of the box. The Woodako
auction system uses:
• five black marbles per bidder, each size represents one price;
• six layers (L0 – L5 ): layers L0 and L1 are made of transparent plexiglass
and have no holes. The other layers are made of wood and contain four
holes per column4, which correspond to the size of the marbles: the holes
3There is a potential attack when a bidder and the seller collude: the seller can open all
bids from the other bidders until he identifies the highest bid, and then inform the colluding
bidder to submit a bid for the same price in order to provoke a tie. Note that this can only
be used to provoke a tie, as submitting a higher bid afterwards results in two envelopes for
different prices containing “Yes” with broken seals, which can be detected. Moreover, it can
be addressed by opening the envelopes for the same price one after the other, and declaring
the first “Yes” as the winner. No other envelope is opened, and hence any situation with two
envelopes containing “Yes” with broken seals (even for the same price, as in the above attack)
identifies a misbehavior of the seller.
4The choice of four holes per column is arbitrary, we simply used multiple holes to improve
practicality.
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(a) The Woodako prototype.
(b) Inside our Woodako prototype, where layers L1 and L2 are
removed.
Figure 2: Our prototype
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in L2 are only big enough for the smallest marbles, the holes in L3 for
the second-smallest etc.;
• three top layers T1 , T2 , T3 – each layer is associated with a bidder;
• two inclined layers: these are placed below the layers, near the bottom of
the box;
• locks and keys: each bidder and the seller has a set of locks and keys;
• one front side made of wood that closes the box and contains holes to
insert the extremities of the layers. These extremities will stick out and so
constitute a place where the parties can put locks. The locks are used to
ensure security properties regarding that layer, for example that it cannot
be removed unless everybody agrees.
4.1 Description
The wooden box carries out the important steps of the auction in a secure way
through its physical properties. The box (see Figure 2b) is composed of three
columns and seven horizontal plus two inclined layers. Each column (the left,
middle and right part of the box) corresponds to one bidder. The top layers T1 ,
T2 and T3 are used to achieve confidentiality of the bid of each bidder, as the
marbles (corresponding to the bids) are inserted underneath. The transparent
layer L0 is used to lock the bids, once they are made, to achieve non-repudiation
and non-cancellation. The five lower horizontal layers L1 – L5 are used to
determine the winning price in a private way. Finally, the two inclined layers
are intended to make it impossible to know from which column a marble fell by
guiding all of them to the same spot in the bottom left part of the box.
The main idea is the following: Each bidder places his bid, represented by
a marble of a certain size, in the top part of the box. We use five different
sizes, the smallest one representing the highest possible price, and the biggest
one representing the lowest possible price. In the bidding phase, all marbles
are inserted into the box onto solid layer L1 . In the opening phase, layer L1 is
removed. Below there is layer L2 with holes big enough to only let the smallest
marbles pass through. Below L2 , there is L3 with bigger holes (the size of the
next biggest marble), etc. If a bidder inputs the smallest marble (the highest
possible price), it will fall through all layers once the solid layer is removed, hence
revealing the winning price – but not the winning bidder, thanks to the inclined
layers. If nobody inserted the smallest marble, no marble will fall through and
the participants can remove the next layer to check for the second highest price,
and so on.
All layers L0 – L5 are equipped with four locks, one for each of the three
bidders, plus one for the seller. This ensures that a layer can only be removed
if all parties agree to do so. Similarly, the removable front side of the box is
attached using four locks in the four corners (cf. Figure 3a), one for each bidder
plus one for the seller. This allows the parties to inspect the interior of the box
before starting the protocol.
The topmost layer consists of three independent parts T1 , T2 and T3 that
each bidder can use to secure his bid (i.e. his marble inside the box, cf. Fig. 3a).
Once all bids are inserted, the transparent layer L0 is inserted just below and
14
locked by all parties to ensure non-cancellation (cf. Fig. 2b). Once the winning
price is determined, the bidders can open their column by removing their lock
on Ti and check through the transparent layer if their part of the box is empty
or not, i.e. if they won or not (cf. Fig. 3c).
Similarly the seller can remove the two inclined layers at the bottom to check
if a marble is present inside a column or not (cf. Fig. 3d). The first solid layer
L1 of the price determination part is transparent to allow the participants to
check at the start of the protocol if each bidder inserted exactly one marble.
Note also that all participants are always in presence of the box to be able to
detect misbehavior.
The protocol is then broken down into 4 phases:
1) Initialization: Each participant can check all the material and see the
inside of the box as in Figure 2b to convince himself of the correct design of the
machine. The seller gives black marbles of different sizes to each bidder. The
smallest marble corresponds to the biggest price, the biggest marble represents
the lowest price. Moreover the seller and each bidder have a set of padlocks and
keys (as in Fig. 3a). Once all bidders have checked the box and received their
material, the seller closes the box with the front side. The seller and each bidder
put a padlock on the box (on each corner of Fig. 3b, marked with 1, 2, 3, and
S). The seller places the layers L1 – L5 in the box, but neither the individual
top layers T1 , T2 and T3 nor the transparent layer L0 . The seller also places
the two inclined layers in the bottom of the box. Finally, he puts one lock on
each layer on the middle column, and all four locks on the inclined layers. He
also assigns a column to each bidder.
2) Bidding Phase: Each bidder selects a marble corresponding to the price
he wants to bid and puts it in his column without showing the marble to the
other parties. He then closes his column using his top layer Ti and secures it
using one of his locks. He also puts locks on the five layers L1 – L5 below.
In Fig. 3a you can see the box after bidder number 2 assigned to the middle
column has made his bid. Once all bids are made and all locks in place, the
seller introduces the transparent plexiglass layer L0 , i.e. in the hole between
the individual top layers and the first full layer L1 . Finally each participant
puts a lock on plexiglass layer L0 .
3) Opening Phase: The seller and all bidders verify that each bidder
inserted exactly one marble by removing the inclined layers (to which the seller
has the keys) and looking through the holes of layers L2 – L5 and the plexiglass
layer L1 from below5. After the inclined layers have been reinstalled and locked
by the seller, all participants remove their lock on the layer L1 , and the seller
removes it. If somebody chose to bid the highest possible price, i.e. inserted
the smallest possible marble, it will now fall down through all the holes (since
all lower layers have bigger holes) and all participants know the winning price,
yet not the winner. If no marble falls down, they repeat this process with the
next layer below corresponding to the next price. In Figure 3b, we see the back
of the box once the two first prices have been tested. The inclined layers are
there to hide from which column the marble fell, as all marbles will end up in
the bottom left part independently of where they came from (cf. Figure 2b).
4) Verification Phase: Once a marble has fallen down, each bidder can
5In our experiments it was sometimes necessary to incline the box slightly so that the
marbles stay in the same corner, similar to Fig. 3d
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(a) The Woodako box after the bid of bid-
der number two.
(b) The Woodako box after two prices have been
tested.
(c) Bidder verifiability (i.e. view from top). (d) Seller verifiability (i.e. view from bottom).
Figure 3: The Woodako box: bidding, determining the winner, and verification
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open his lock on his top layer Ti and check if his marble is still inside. In
Figure 3c, bidder number two notes that his marble is still inside the box, so he
did not win. Similarly the seller can remove the two inclined layers and check
for each column, whether there is still a marble inside, hence determining the
winner – the column with no marble. An example is given in Figure 3d: the left
bidder won since his column is empty, and the two others lost, as their marbles
are still there (highlighted by the yellow circles).
Resolving ties: Note that in the case of a tie two or more marbles fall
down at the same time. Thus everybody knows that there is a tie, the seller
can also identify the tied parties, and the bidders know if they are tied or not.
Moreover a tied party can prove to anybody that he is tied by opening his top
and showing that his compartment is empty. To resolve the situation either an
external tie-breaking mechanism can be used (e.g. rolling a die), or the auction
can simply be restarted. Using an external mechanism implies revealing the
identity of the tied parties or trusting the seller, since he is the only one who
knows who is tied. If privacy is the main concern and the seller is not to be
trusted, the auction can simply be restarted and giving the bidders the chance
to modify their bids. Sako’s protocol (our inspiration) also reveals the identity
of the tied parties.
4.2 Security Properties
We now argue how the properties defined in [16, 14] are achieved by our protocol,
as long as there is at least one honest party following the protocol (i.e. one bidder
or the seller).
Non-cancellation and non-repudiation. Everybody can see in which col-
umn a bidder inserted his marble. Due to the fact that the layer L0 is locked
by all the participants, nobody can change his price during the execution of the
protocol. Hence nobody can cancel his bid. Similarly nobody can deny that it
was his marble that fell down as the seller and the concerned bidder can verify in
which column a marble is still present. Moreover the check at the beginning of
the opening phase ensures due to the transparent layer L1 that there is exactly
one marble per bidder.
Fairness. We consider the two aspects defined in [16]: 1) Highest-Price-Wins:
By the design of the box and the holes of different size in layers L2 – L5 , the
highest price offered by a bidder which is represented by the smallest marble
is the first marble to fall down. No bidder can make a larger marble drop
before a smaller one. 2) Weak-Non-Interference: For a given set of bidders no
information about the bids is leaked until the end of the bidding phase, since
each bidder can choose his marble privately and drop it into the box in such a
way that nobody can identify its size.
Privacy. The winner is only known to the seller and himself, but everybody
knows the winning price. The inclined layers prevent anybody else from deter-
mining the winner by observing from which column the marble fell6. Once a
6Note that with two layers as shown in Figure 2b there is a side-channel attack: If the
marble falls down in the rightmost column, one can hear the sound of a falling marble only
once, whereas in the case of the other two columns the marble falls down twice. However there
are some simple solutions: one can extend both layers further to the right so that the marbles
fall down twice independently of their original column, or one can use something similar to
a “bean machine”, i.e. several rows of pins, arranged so that the falling marble hits a pin in
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marble has dropped, the winner can check if his column is empty by unlocking
his top layer Ti and looking inside. The seller can also determine the winner
by removing the inclined layers and checking which column is empty as shown
in Figure 3d. Since the remaining marbles are too big to fall through the holes,
the seller can only see if there is a marble, but will be unable to determine its
size, as all marbles have the same color. This preserves the secrecy of the losing
bids. The losing bidders can also open their top layers Ti and verify if their
marbles are still inside as shown in Figure 3c. This leaks no information about
the winner, yet they know the price from the moment when the marble falls as
each layer corresponds to a price.
Verifiability. The registration is done at the beginning of the protocol by
the seller, and all participants can check if only the registered bidders participate
by inserting a marble into the box. Hence the protocol ensures registration
verifiability. Outcome verifiability is achieved by the fact that each participant
can check the box and the mechanism at the beginning of the protocol, and
that each bidder can check at the end whether he lost or won by opening his
top layer Ti . The seller can also verify the outcome by opening the bottom of
the box.
4.3 Formal Analysis
To formally verify the security properties of the protocol we need to model
the properties of the box. We represent its current state by an object denoted
machine(·). We use an equational theory to model possible changes to it. A
machine(·) has the following parameters, where the index i represents a bidder
among the n bidders, j a price among the m prices, and s the seller:
• bji representing the different compartments (for each bidder and price, i.e.
above L1 to L5 for bidder one, two and three in our prototype) of the box,
which can be empty or contain a marble of a certain size.
• lji and ljs represent the locks (or rather: the keys necessary to open the
locks) that need to be opened to remove a layer Lj (where j ∈ {1, . . . , n})
from the “sieve” part of the machine, one for each bidder and one for the
seller.
• ti are the locks used by the bidders to close the top layer Ti after they
inserted their bid.
• pi and ps are the locks on the plexiglass layer L0 .
• bs represents the locks by the seller on the inclined layers at the bottom
(for simplicity we model only one instead of four).
• wk (k ∈ {1, . . . , n ∗ m}) represent the lower left part of the box where
the “winning” marbles that have fallen down end up. We need multiple
variables since all marbles fall down if all layers are removed. To simplify
the equational theory we have different variables for each price, as this al-
lows us to have independent equations for removing each layer – otherwise
each row. The idea is that the marble has a 50% chance of falling down on either side of the
pin, hence arrives at a random location on the bottom.
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we need to take the current state of the wks into account, which further
increases the number of equations.
We also define the following functions:
• check window: takes as input a machine and returns the wk to check if
a marble has fallen down. This function dose not require any key to be
applied.
• price j: takes as input a machine, the keys lji and ljs, and returns a
machine where the layer j was removed and potentially marbles have fallen
down.
• open top i: takes as input a machine and the key ti, and returns the
contents of all bji for bidder j. This corresponds to the bidder verification
check by looking through the plexiglass layer L0 .
• open bottom: takes as input a machine and the key bs, and returns a
vector indicating if the columns contain marbles or not. This corresponds
to the seller verification check.
• change top i: takes as input a machine, all the keys pk (k among all the
bidders), ps and the single ti and a new marble to place into bidder i’s
top compartment.
Consider an example of two bidders and two prices. Suppose the first bidder
bids the highest possible price (constant one), and the second bidder bids the
lower price two. Then the initial state of the machine m is:
m = machine(one, two, empty, empty, l11, l12, l1s, l21, l22, l2s,
t1, t2, p1, p2, ps, bs, empty, empty, empty, empty)
If we compute m1 = open top one(m, l11, l12, l1s) we obtain
m1 = machine(empty, empty, empty, two, l11, l12, l1s, l21, l22,
l2s, t1, t2, p1, p2, ps, bs, one, empty, empty, empty)
Any party can apply check window on m1 to obtain (one, empty, empty, empty)
and hence observe that a bidder won at price one. The seller can determine
that bidder one won by computing open bottom(m1, bs) = (empty, something).
Similarly bidder one can check he is the winner by applying open top 1(m1, t1)
= (empty, empty), and bidder two can verify his marble is still in the box using
open top 2(m1, t2) = (empty, two).
Since the number of parameters of the machine depends on the number of
bidders and prices, we are unable to define them in a general way in ProVerif.
However we have developed a python script that generates the necessary equa-
tions for a given number of bidders and prices. For the functions price j and
open bottom this also consists in enumerating all possible cases based on the
possible bid values.
The script also generates a process procMachine that receives the marbles
and all the keys from the bidders and the seller, and sends the resulting machine
to all participants. They can then execute the “computation” on their copy of
the machine, and only need to exchange the keys necessary. Note also that
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this is an over-approximation since we create many copies of the same machine,
which can even evolve differently, although this is not possible in the real world.
The ProVerif code for the bidder and seller is straightforward, it is available
online [15].
Note that in our model a bidder may insert at most one marble into the box,
whereas in the real world he could try to insert several. This may lead to attacks
on e.g. non-repudiation or non-cancellation: a bidder could insert two marbles.
The seller will observe one marble falling down when the first layer is removed.
However, when he opens the bottom of the box to check for the winner, each
column still contains a marble. To prevent this, the bidders and the seller check
at the beginning if there is exactly one marble per column. Hence we argue that
the approximation in our model is correct.
The model allows us to prove in ProVerif that the Woodako protocol ensures
Non-Repudiation (even if all bidders are corrupted), Non-Cancellation, Weak
Non-Interference, Highest Price Wins and Verifiability.
When verifying Privacy we consider two cases: If the seller is dishonest, the
protocol only ensures secrecy of the losing bids, but the winner and winning
price are revealed. If the seller is honest, the winner stays anonymous, and
only the winning price is revealed. We can prove both results in ProVerif, but
the verification takes approximately 24 hours for the dishonest seller and 36
hours for the honest seller case. This is due to the complexity of the equational
theory and the equivalence proof. All other properties can be proved within a
few seconds. Note that – as above – we only consider the base case (i.e. two
bidders) due to the complexity of the equational theory for higher number of
bidders and possible prices.
5 Conclusion
Current auction protocols rely on complex cryptographic operations. However,
we argued that verifiability of an auction should not depend on cryptographic ex-
pertise – without understanding, there is no meaningful verifiability. With that
in mind, we adapted a suitable cryptographic auction protocol to achieve its
security properties without cryptography. We began by analyzing Sako’s proto-
col for Non-Cancellation, Non-Repudiation, Fairness, Verifiability and Privacy
informally, and formally using the ProVerif tool. As the protocol mostly passed
our automated scrutiny (for privacy, the auctioneers have to be trusted), we
took this protocol as a base for the development of our two protocols.
We then proposed the Envelopako protocol, an auction protocol inspired by
Sako’s protocol where each bidder marks on a separate piece of paper for each
possible price if they want to bid this price or not. These bidding forms are
then inserted into signed envelopes, which are opened in descending order to
determine the winner in a private way. We modeled the physical properties of the
envelopes using an equational theory in ProVerif, which allows to apply the exact
same analysis as for the cryptographic protocol. The analysis successfully proved
Non-Repudiation, Non-Cancellation, Weak Non-Interference, Verifiability, and
Highest Price Wins. For privacy, an issue was automatically found: dishonest
participants may open an envelope to see the corresponding bidding form. A
mitigation is that such actions are readily detectable by all, as any handling of
the envelopes occurs in public view. We also discussed a distributed variant of
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this protocol with a semi-trusted seller, i.e. the protocol does not prevent him
from misbehaving, but any misbehavior can be detected.
To improve privacy, we introduced the Woodako protocol. This protocol is
again inspired by Sako’s protocol, and again replaces cryptography and trusted
parties by physical properties. Bids are represented by marbles, where smaller
marbles denote higher bids. Bidders place the marble corresponding to their
bid in their designated column in a (mechanical) contraption. Then, the first
layer below all columns is removed, leaving a new layer with holes the size of
the smallest marble. If at least one marble falls through, there is a winner, oth-
erwise this layer is removed and the next layer with larger holes is now the base
layer. We argued that Woodako achieves Non-Repudiation, Non-Cancellation,
Weak Non-Interference, Verifiability, and Highest Price Wins. Moreover, this
argumentation did not require any expert knowledge to understand, nor did it
hinge on correct behavior by trusted parties. As the seller knows the winning
bidder, a dishonest seller can reveal the winner. As such, the protocol ensures
Privacy for all bidders including anonymity of the winner in case of an honest
seller, and simple privacy for losing bidders in case of a dishonest seller. This
was again confirmed by a formal analysis in ProVerif.
Finally, we formally analyzed the Woodako protocol, again modeling physical
properties in equational theory. The model of our physical implementation was
proven correct with respect to the mentioned security properties using ProVerif.
As the seller knows the winning bidder, a dishonest seller can reveal the winner.
As such, we automatically proved privacy for all bidders including anonymity
of the winner in case of an honest seller, and simple privacy for losing bidders
in case of a dishonest seller.
As future work we look to improve the practicality of our protocols, as they
do not scale well for higher numbers of bidders or possible prices. Moreover, we
would like to examine whether our protocols can be adapted for second-price
auctions, and how we can improve the handling of ties. For this we are looking
into other cryptographic protocols as sources of inspiration.
Moreover, the proofs we currently have for Sako’s protocol as well as En-
velopako are not generic in the number of bidders and bids. As future work, we
are looking to provide a fully generic proof for the both protocols. Similarly,
the states space of the Woodako protocol scales too fast for automated proofs
with higher numbers of bidders and prices. In this case, we are working towards
a reduction proof for the general case.
Acknowledgments.
This research was conducted with the support of the ”Digital trust” Chair from
the University of Auvergne Foundation, and partly supported by the ANR
project ProSe (decision ANR 2010-VERS-004). We also want to thank our
carpenter Sylvain Thouvarecq for helping us building the Woodako prototype.
References
[1] M. Abadi and C. Fournet. Mobile values, new names, and secure commu-
nication. In POPL’01, pages 104–115, 2001.
21
[2] M. Abdalla, M. Bellare, and G. Neven. Robust encryption. In Proc. 7th
Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC’10), volume 5978 of LNCS, pages
480–497. Springer, 2010.
[3] M. Abe and K. Suzuki. Receipt-free sealed-bid auction. In Proc. 5th Con-
ference on Information Security, volume 2433 of LNCS, pages 191–199.
Springer, 2002.
[4] D. Basin, S. Capkun, P. Schaller, and B. Schmidt. Formal Reasoning about
Physical Properties of Security Protocols. ACM Transactions on Informa-
tion and System Security, pages 1–28, 2011.
[5] B. Blanchet. An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on
Prolog Rules. In Proc. 14th Computer Security Foundations Workshop
(CSFW’14), pages 82–96. IEEE, June 2001.
[6] B. Blanchet, B. Smith, and V. Cheval. Proverif Manual, 1.87beta6 edition,
march 2013. http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/bblanche/
proverif/manual.pdf.
[7] M. Blaze. Toward a broader view of security protocols. In Proc. Security
Protocols workshop 2004, volume 3957 of LNCS, pages 106–120. Springer
Verlag, 2006.
[8] F. Brandt. How to obtain full privacy in auctions. International Journal
of Information Security, 5:201–216, 2006.
[9] Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court). Use
of voting computers in 2005 bundestag election unconstitutional. Press
release 19/2009 http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/
bvg09-019en.html, 2009.
[10] D. Chaum. Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections. IEEE
Security & Privacy, 2(1):38–47, 2004.
[11] T. Dimkov, W. Pieters, and P. H. Hartel. Portunes: Representing attack
scenarios spanning through the physical, digital and social domain. In
ARSPA-WITS’10, LNCS, 2011.
[12] N. Dong, H. L. Jonker, and J. Pang. Analysis of a receipt-free auction
protocol in the applied pi calculus. In FAST’10, volume 6561 of LNCS,
2011.
[13] J. Dreier, J.-G. Dumas, and P. Lafourcade. Brandt’s fully private auction
protocol revisited. In Proc. AFRICACRYPT’13, volume 7918 of LNCS,
pages 88–106, 2013.
[14] J. Dreier, H. L. Jonker, and P. Lafourcade. Defining verifiability in e-
auction protocols. In Proc. ASIACCS 2013, pages 547–552. ACM, 2013.
[15] J. Dreier, P. Lafourcade, and H. Jonker. The proverif code used to au-
tomatically verify the examples is available at http://people.inf.ethz.
ch/jdreier/papers/physical-code.zip, 2014.
22
[16] J. Dreier, P. Lafourcade, and Y. Lakhnech. Formal verification of e-auction
protocols. In Proc. 2nd Conference on Principles of Security and Trust
(POST’13), LNCS, 2013.
[17] T. El Gamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on
discrete logarithms. In Proc. Advances in cryptology - CRYPTO’84, pages
10–18. Springer, 1985.
[18] R. Fagin, M. Naor, and P. Winkler. Comparing information without leaking
it. Commun. ACM, 39(5):77–85, May 1996.
[19] S. Izmalkov, M. Lepinski, and S. Micali. Perfect implementation. Games
and Economic Behavior, 71(1):121–140, 2011.
[20] R. Johnston. Effective vulnerability assessment of tamper-indicating seals.
Journal of Testing and Evaluation, 25(4), July 1997.
[21] R. Ku¨sters, T. Truderung, and A. Vogt. Accountability: definition and
relationship to verifiability. In CCS’10, pages 526–535. ACM, 2010.
[22] H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and V. Niemi. Secure vickrey auctions without
threshold trust. In Proc. 6th Conference on Financial Cryptography, volume
2357 of LNCS, pages 87–101, 2003.
[23] C. Meadows and D. Pavlovic. Formalizing physical security procedures. In
Proc. 8th workshop on Security and Trust Management (STM12), volume
7783 of LNCS, pages 193–208, 2013.
[24] T. Moran and M. Naor. Polling with physical envelopes: A rigorous analysis
of a human-centric protocol. In Proc. EUROCRYPT 2006, volume 4004 of
LNCS, pages 88–108, 2006.
[25] T. Moran and M. Naor. Basing cryptographic protocols on tamper-evident
seals. Theor. Comput. Sci., 411(10):1283–1310, 2010.
[26] M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and
mechanism design. In Proc. 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,
pages 129–139, 1999.
[27] K. Omote and A. Miyaji. A practical english auction with one-time regis-
tration. In Proc. ACISP’01, volume 2119 of LNCS, pages 221–234, 2001.
[28] D. C. Parkes, M. O. Rabin, S. M. Shieber, and C. Thorpe. Practical
secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. Electronic
Commerce Research and Applications, 7(3):294–312, 2008.
[29] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital
signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM, 21(2):120–126,
Feb. 1978.
[30] K. Sako. An auction protocol which hides bids of losers. In Proc. 3rd
Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, volume
1751 of LNCS, pages 422–432, 2000.
23
[31] B. Schneier. The solitaire encryption algorithm. http://www.schneier.
com/solitaire.html, 1999.
[32] F. Stajano and R. J. Anderson. The cocaine auction protocol: On the
power of anonymous broadcast. In Proc. Information Hiding’00, volume
1768 of LNCS, pages 434–447, 1999.
[33] S. G. Stubblebine and P. F. Syverson. Fair on-line auctions without special
trusted parties. In 3rd Conference on Financial Cryptography, volume 1648
of LNCS, pages 230–240, 1999.
[34] S. Subramanian. Design and verification of a secure electronic auction
protocol. In Proc. 17th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems
(SRDS’98), 1998.
24
